Another Fourth of July event for me is to watch the very long movie “Gettysburg.”
Obviously, the movie is named for the battle fought over the first three days of July
1863, which went a long way towards the ultimate resolution of the American
Civil War. Is it fully factual? Not exactly. The movie is based on a novel by the
late Michael Shaara, “The Killer Angels.” The plot focuses on one major heroic
event from each of the battle’s three days. These are: Union General John Buford’s
Cavalry Division’s actions on July 1 to secure the high ground; the actions of Col.
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain’s 20 th Maine on July 2 nd to hold the end of the
Union line on Little Round Top; and Confederate General George Pickett’s ill-
fated charge on July 3 rd directed at the Union Center. But… there was much more
to the battle than that, there were other strategic venues, Culp’s Hill, the Peach
Prchard and Devil’s Den to name but a few.
Gettysburg was the collision point of 160,000 men for a titanic three-day struggle.
Why? Even today it does not seem to be much of a strategic location. To answer
that, one must get inside the head of General Robert E. Lee, commander of the
Army of Northern Virginia, the opponent of the Union’s Army of the Potomac.
(There were multiple Northern and Southern Armies during the war. Southern
Armies were usually named after states or regions: Army of Northern Virginia;
Army of Mississippi; Army of Tennessee; and about twenty more. Northern
Armies were more generally named after rivers: Army of the Potomac; Army of
the Ohio; Army of the Shenandoah and about a dozen more. It can be confusing to
figure out who was who at times.)
All wars are political acts with a political purpose. In this war the political purpose
was for the eleven southern states to achieve their independence from the United
States. Their ultimate goal was to perpetuate their slave-based society and
economy. Many of their leaders referred to the conflict as a “Second American
Revolution.” They even featured George Washington on the Great Seal of the
Confederacy.
From the beginning Lee knew that he was at a disadvantage. For example, the
South had about five million non-enslaved people, compared to twenty-two million
people in the Northern states. Experts estimate that in 1860 the manufacturing
output of New York City exceeded that of the eleven Confederate states. It is
estimated that in 1860 the South contributed only 8% of the nation’s entire Gross
Domestic Product. A simple example of the power discrepancy is that the largest
manufacturer of rifles in the South produced 30,000 rifles during the four years of

the conflict. In contrast the Northern rifle factory at Springfield Massachusetts
averaged 15,000 rifles per month. These differences can be referred to as a
“resource means disparity.”
Lee, like many leaders, had the advantage of a U.S. Military Academy education.
He was taught at West Point that in war R= M x W. Like e = mc2 in physics, this
equation has a meaning: R stands for ability to resist the opponent, M stands for
the means to conduct a war and W stands for the will of the society to support the
war. In Lee’s mind he knew that his armies could not destroy the Union’s ability to
wage war, i.e. M, the Means. Therefore, his only viable strategy was to reduce
support for the war in the northern states, i.e. diminish the Will (W) of the people
of the north to continue to pay for the war with their tax dollars and the blood of
their husbands and sons. With his string of early victories in the first two years of
the war that part of the equation was gaining traction. (The Democratic Party was
preparing to head into the 1864 elections on a peace platform.) Lee’s strategy, post
Chancellorsville, was to erode Northern morale by smashing the Army of the
Potomac, its largest and least successful army, on Northern territory. Even though
he had just defeated that army soundly in May of 1863 at Chancellorsville, he had
not destroyed it. In return Lee lost 35 % of his regimental commanders, 33% of his
brigade commanders AND his best Corps Commander, Thomas L Jackson, aka
Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. Since the Army of the Potomac got away to
fight another day, to Lee, these losses were for naught. Hence, he began a long
march northward with the idea of seizing Harrisburg PA, and threatening
Washington D.C. drawing the Army of the Potomac to follow in his wake in that
city’s defense, and smashing it in Northern territory.
Is it local history? Maybe, maybe not. The battle site is 225 miles away, today
that’s a mere four-hour car ride from New Manchester WV. However, some of our
local soldiers were likely present then.
In reviewing the Confederate Order of Battle at Gettysburg there were about
70,000 men that came north. These were divided into Three Corps of Infantry each
having three divisions of foot soldiers, each division usually containing three
brigades comprised of four or five regiments. A regiment, (of 10-12 companies)
would ideally contain 1,000 men. Additionally, there was an entire corps of
cavalry. However, as the war had been going on since April of 1861, the typical
regiment likely consisted of ten companies of forty to seventy soldiers. If you do
the math it is obvious that individual units were under-manned.

The dirt roadways of Virginia. Maryland and West Virginia were not conducive to
moving about 160,000 soldiers quickly. Corps of Confederate troops were sent
north on separate roads so as to stay out of each other’s way. The Union forces
were doing the same and were about two days behind the Confederates at the start,
but were gaining ground without Lee’s knowledge. When Lee became aware that
the Union forces were close at hand he called his Army together. Gettysburg was
the location where five major roads came together, as did the two armies.
There were fifty-six Virginia Regiments in the Army of Northern Virginia at
Gettysburg. While a number of these such as the 10 th Virginia, 31 st Virginia and 27 th
Virginia Infantry Regiments were principally recruited from Harpers Ferry,
Berkley and Marion Counties respectively; and many others had recruits from what
would be West Virginia, only the 27 th Virginia Infantry seems to have had a
significant number of recruits from our Panhandle.
West Virginia became a state on June 20, 1863. Even though this was only ten
days before the battle, Union military units from the counties that comprised our
new state were fighting under the name “West Virginia.” Therefore, the Union
Order of Battle is easier to analyze in regard to our area. While the Army of the
Potomac had almost 90,000 men at Gettysburg representing elements of eight
infantry and one Cavalry Corps, four WV units were present at Gettysburg,
namely: the 7 th WV Infantry; 1 st and 3 rd WV Cavalry and Battery C of the 1 st WV
Light Artillery. There were also soldiers in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Maryland
Regiments who came from what would be West Virginia to sign up to fight for
regiments formed in those states.
The battle is local for me because I believe that my great-great grandfather, John
Riley was at Gettysburg with the 1 st WV Cavalry as 10 of its 12 companies were
there, as part of the First Cavalry Brigade of the Third Cavalry Division. The
Division was commanded by Union Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick,
nicknamed by his troopers as “Kill Cavalry.”
In my next column I hope to be able to relate some of the experiences of our West
Virginia soldiers during the battle.